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Dynamic retail pricing, especially real-time pricing (RTP), has been widely heralded as a 
panacea for providing much-needed demand response in electricity markets.  However, in 
designing default service for competitive retail markets, demand response has been an 
afterthought, and in some cases not given any weight at all.  But that may be changing, as states 
that initiated customer choice in the past 5-7 years reach an important juncture in retail market 
design.  
Most states with retail choice established an initial transitional period during which 
utilities were required to offer a default or standard offer generation service, often at a capped or 
otherwise administratively-determined rate.  Many retail choice states have reached the end of 
their transitional period, and several have adopted or are actively considering an RTP-type 
default service for large commercial and industrial (C&I) customers.  In most cases, the primary 
reason for adopting RTP as the default service has been to advance policy objectives related to 
the development of competitive retail markets.  However, if attention is paid in its design and 
implementation, default RTP service can also provide a solid foundation for developing price 
responsive demand, creating an important link between wholesale and retail market transactions.    
This article, which draws from a lengthier report, describes experience to date with RTP 
as a default service, focusing on its role as an instrument for cultivating price responsive 
demand.1  As of summer 2005, default service RTP was in place or approved for future 
implementation in five U.S. states: New Jersey, Maryland, Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois.  
For each of these states, we conducted a detailed review of the regulatory proceedings leading to 
adoption of default RTP and interviewed regulatory staff and utilities in these states, as well as 
eight competitive retail suppliers active in these markets. 
   
I. Overview of Default RTP Service in the U.S. 
 
RTP is currently the default service for the largest C&I customers of ten investor-owned 
utilities (IOU) and is planned or proposed for sixteen others (see Table 1).  In most cases, it has 
been implemented through a regulatory process, the central purpose of which was to establish the 
post-transition supply service for an individual utility or all utilities in the state.  These regulatory 
processes have typically been guided by a set of broad statutory mandates (e.g., that default 
service be market-based) and involved a large number of stakeholders attempting to address and 
resolve a wide range of issues.   
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Based on interviews with selected stakeholders and our review of the regulatory record, it 
is evident that adoption of RTP as the default service has been motivated largely to foster the 
development of competitive retail markets.  RTP has several features that make it an attractive 
candidate for default service from the perspective of retail market development.  First, it 
encourages switching by motivating customers that do not want to face hourly prices to seek out 
hedged supply contracts with competitive suppliers.  Second, it avoids the use of class average 
load profiles for commodity pricing, and with it, intra-class cross-subsidies that distort the retail 
market.  Third, because RTP prices reflect current market conditions, there is no need to impose 
switching restrictions to prevent customers and/or suppliers from taking advantage of seasonal 
arbitrage opportunities between default and competitive service. 
 
Table 1.  Default service RTP in the U.S. 
State Status of Default Service RTP Implementation 
New Jersey Implemented by all four IOUs in August 2003 
Maryland Implemented by BGE from June 2002-June 2003 (superseded by statewide default service) 
Implemented by BGE, PEPCO, and Delmarva in June 2005 
Scheduled for implementation by Allegheny Power in January 2006 
Pennsylvania Implemented by Duquesne in January 2005 
Proposal currently under consideration for the other 10 IOUs in the state 
Delaware Scheduled for implementation by Delmarva in May 2006. 
New York Implemented by Niagara Mohawk in November 1998 
Implemented by CHG&E in May 2005 
Other four NY IOUs directed to file default RTP tariffs 
Illinois Scheduled for implementation by Commonwealth Edison (ComEd) in January 2007.   
RTP offered as an optional (opt-in) service by all Illinois IOUs since 1998. 
 
II. Default RTP Tariff Design and Implementation  
 
The default RTP tariffs currently in place have several features that are important for 
understanding their potential role as a source of price responsive demand.  First, all employ an 
unbundled and unhedged commodity (energy) charge.  Energy costs are calculated for each 
customer on an hourly basis by multiplying its usage in that hour by the prevailing hourly market 
price.  The two New York utilities with default RTP – Niagara Mohawk, a National Grid 
Company, and Central Hudson Gas & Electric (CHG&E) – index their default RTP rates to the 
New York Independent System Operator (NYISO)’s day-ahead energy market, which publishes 
hourly prices by 4:00 p.m. on the prior day.  In contrast, utilities in New Jersey, Maryland, and 
Pennsylvania use the PJM real-time market as the basis for the hourly prices of their default RTP 
rates.  Because hourly prices in PJM’s real-time market are not determined until after the 
applicable hour has elapsed, customers on these default RTP rates do not know the exact prices 
they will be charged until after-the-fact.2    
 The customer size threshold for defining the default RTP class is a second major 
implementation issue.  The first utilities to implement default RTP did so only for the very 
largest customers (e.g., >1.5 MW billing demand).  However, over time, default RTP has been 
adopted for progressively smaller groups of C&I customers, down to 300 kW (see Table 2).  
Several factors have driven the choice of a particular customer size threshold.  In many cases, it 
has reflected some consideration (usually informal) of customers’ ability to either manage hourly 
pricing risks or find a less risky alternative.  The capabilities of the existing metering and billing 
 2
infrastructure has also often been a factor, although regulators in New Jersey and Maryland 
decided to significantly expand interval metering deployment in conjunction with default RTP.3
 Another important design issue is whether the utility offers any hedging options for 
customers in the default RTP class and, if so, for how long (see Table 2).  In Pennsylvania, 
Duquesne Light Company (Duquesne) was required to offer an alternative fixed price, full 
requirements service for two-and-a-half years following default RTP implementation, which 
customers in the default RTP class can elect during specified enrollment windows.  In Maryland, 
large customers were provided with a fixed price, full requirements default service for an 11-
month period (July 2004-May 2005), during which RTP was an optional alternative.   







Other Utility Supply Options for Customers  
in the Default RTP Class 
New Jersey RT >1,250 kW None 
Maryland RT >600 kW None currently.  A fixed-price default service was offered from 
July 2004-May 2005, during which time RTP was optional. 
Duquesne RT >300 kW A fixed-price optional service is offered until mid-2007 
Niagara 
Mohawk 
DA >2,000 kW None currently.  Customers were offered a one-time 
opportunity in 1998 to contract for fixed-price, peak and off-
peak load blocks, for up to five years. 
CHG&E DA >500 kW None 
a RT = hourly usage charged at real-time spot market price; DA = hourly usage charged at day-ahead market price. 
 
III. Customer Exposure to Hourly Spot Market Prices in Competitive Retail Markets  
 
A. Customer Enrollment in Default RTP 
 
A relatively small percentage of customers have chosen to remain on default RTP.  For 
most utilities in Maryland, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, less than 15% of the applicable load 
has remained on default RTP, while the two New York utilities report that 25-35% of the 
applicable load has remained (see Figure 1).  Other customers in the default RTP classes have 
either switched to a competitive supplier or, in the case of Duquesne, opted onto the temporary 
fixed-price utility service.  Yet, despite the small percentage of customers remaining on default 
RTP, the magnitude of load exposed to spot market prices, is not inconsequential.  The total 
enrollment in default RTP among these ten utilities is almost 1,000 MW.  However, because 
these tariffs have been implemented for only several years, it remains to be seen how enrollment 
changes over time as wholesale market conditions evolve and as customers have more time to 
shop for alternative arrangements with competitive suppliers. 
 What do participation rates in default RTP tell us about customers’ willingness to face 
hourly pricing?  Certainly, some customers have responded to the prospect of being placed on 
default RTP by seeking out fixed price supply arrangements with competitive providers.  This, of 
course, was an intended result.  However, not all switching can be attributed to a rejection of 
hourly pricing.  First, in several cases (e.g., Duquesne and Maryland), much of the switching 
occurred prior to implementing default RTP.  Second, many customers have left default RTP to 
sign competitive supply contracts that incorporate hourly pricing, as discussed further in Section 
III.C.  At the same time, it would be erroneous to assume that all customers remaining on default 
RTP are interested in paying hourly prices, as some customers have no doubt remained only out 
of inattention or for want of acceptable fixed price offers.4  
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We can identify several factors that contribute to the differences in default RTP 
participation rates observed among the ten utilities in Figure 1.  First, retail market development 
varies across the utility service territories, and customers may have uneven access to attractive 
competitive alternatives.  Second, details of the default service implementation and tariff design 
are also important.  For example, Duquesne is the only utility that currently offers a fixed price 
service to customers in the default RTP class; not unexpectedly, enrollment in its default RTP 
rate is the lowest among the ten utilities (3%), as ~25% of its large C&I load has switched to the 
fixed-price utility service.  Another key tariff design feature is the advance notice with which 
customers receive hourly prices.  The relatively high default RTP enrollment rates for Niagara 
Mohawk and CHG&E may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that their customers receive 
prices a day in advance, while their counterparts in New Jersey, Maryland, and Pennsylvania 
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Figure 1. Enrollment in Default RTP Service (2004/2005). 
 
B. Hourly Pricing Products Offered by Competitive Retail Suppliers 
 
We asked each of the competitive retailers that were interviewed to describe the types of 
pricing arrangements offered to large C&I customers.  All indicated that, at least in some 
regions, they offer customers the option to purchase all of their commodity (energy) 
requirements at hourly prices indexed to the real-time or day-ahead spot market.  Several 
retailers market these pricing arrangements as providing a “guaranteed savings” off of the default 
RTP service, accomplished by beating the retail adder and/or fixed-price charges (e.g., for 
installed capacity or ancillary services) in the default RTP rate.5
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 All suppliers also offer hedging options to their customers on hourly pricing, although 
none offer hedges to customers remaining on default RTP.  The most common arrangement, 
offered by all suppliers, is a “block-and-index” product, whereby customers willing to expose a 
portion of their load to hour hourly market prices contract for blocks of load at a fixed $/kWh 
price and pay hourly spot market prices for usage in each hour above their block level (see 
Figure 2).  Suppliers typically offer customers some degree of flexibility in customizing the 
shape of the load block (i.e., the hours and days of the week covered by the block) as well as the 
size of the load block relative to their total load.6  Some suppliers treat the load block as a take-
or-pay obligation.  Others credit customers for load reductions below the block level hour-by-
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Figure 2.  Block-and-Index Pricing Arrangement 
 
C. Market Penetration of Hourly Pricing with Competitive Suppliers 
 
We asked retail suppliers to estimate the percentage of their large C&I load either on a 
block-and-index arrangement or fully exposed to hourly spot market prices (see Table 3).  
Reported market penetration rates ranged from 50-75% in New Jersey, while values reported for 
most other markets were lower, typically in the range of 5-25%.7   
When asked about factors driving customer demand for hourly-priced supply contracts, 
retail suppliers indicated that customers’ ability and willingness to respond to hourly prices was 
typically not a significant driver.  Suppliers offered several alternative explanations: (1) some 
customers are looking for a guaranteed savings off of the default RTP rate; (2) some are simply 
riding the market, waiting until the time is right to lock in a fixed price contract; and (3) some 
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have decided that the premium for a fixed price, full-requirements service is greater than the 
value they place on the price certainty such contracts provide.  Finally, almost all suppliers 
suggested that much of the current demand for spot market indexed arrangements was 
temporary, due to low spot market volatility and relatively mild weather, and would probably 
wane over the long run. 
Differences in the penetration of hourly spot market indexed pricing arrangements can be 
attributed to several factors.  First, when the interviews were conducted in late 2004, default RTP 
service was in place only in New Jersey and in Niagara Mohawk’s service territory.  If, as many 
suppliers suggested, some customers seek out competitive supply contracts that offer a 
guaranteed savings off the default rate, we would expect that demand for hourly pricing with 
competitive suppliers would be greater in regions with default RTP.  Second, the definition of 
the large C&I class, which is based on the customer size threshold for default RTP, differs 
significantly among states.  If, as many suppose, larger customers are more predisposed to hourly 
pricing, then we would expect higher market penetration rates for hourly pricing products in 
Niagara Mohawk’s territory and New Jersey, where the customer size threshold is relatively 
high.  Finally, the composition of business types may vary across regions in ways that are 
correlated with customers’ willingness to face hourly prices (e.g., certain types of large industrial 
customers).    
 
Table 3. Market penetration of hourly spot market indexed pricing arrangements 
Large C&I Market Supplier Percent of Large C&I Load Facing Hourly Spot Market Prices on the Margin 
Niagara Mohawk SC-3A class 2 >90% 
2 75% 
5 50-60% New Jersey CIEP class 
6 50% 
5 5% Maryland Type III class 6 20% 
3 10% PJM region 4 <25% 
NYISO region 6 10-15% 
ISO-NE region 1 10% 
Notes: The Niagara Mohawk SC-3A class, New Jersey CIEP class, and Maryland Type III class refer to the default 
RTP service classes in each respective region.   
 
D. Customer Load Facing Hourly Prices  
 
In states with default RTP and retail choice, two groups of customers face hourly prices: 
those that have remained on default RTP and those that are purchasing their supply from a 
competitive provider through some type of hourly pricing arrangement.  State regulatory 
commissions typically publish information on the number of customers and amount of load 
remaining on default RTP, as part of their efforts to track switching rates.  However, very little 
information is currently available in the public domain regarding the amount of load facing 
hourly prices through competitive retail supply contracts.   
To fill this void, we estimated the amount of load facing hourly spot market prices 
through competitive retail supply contracts within three large C&I customer populations: the 
New Jersey CIEP class, the Maryland Type III class, and Niagara Mohawk’s SC-3A class.  We 
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derived these estimates from individual suppliers’ statements about the portion of their large C&I 
load exposed to hourly pricing, from our surveys of customers in Niagara Mohawk’s service 
territory, and from public data on suppliers’ market share.8  We then combined these estimates 
with data on default RTP enrollment, to estimate the total load facing hourly prices in these three 
markets.   
Using this approach, we estimate that, as of Summer 2005, 35-60% of the large C&I load 
in New Jersey, 15-25% in Maryland, and approximately 65% in Niagara Mohawk’s service 
territory is facing hourly prices, either through the default RTP service or a competitive retail 
supply contract.  Based on the mid-points of these ranges, approximately 8% of the system peak 
load in New Jersey, 4% in Maryland, and 6% in Niagara Mohawk’s service territory is facing 
hourly spot market prices (see Figure 3).  
Given this information, the key question from the perspective of characterizing the 
associated price responsive demand is: How responsive are these customers to changes in hourly 
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Figure 3. Total Load Facing Hourly Spot Market Prices on the Margin.  The error bars reflect our high and 
low estimates for the amount of load facing hourly prices through competitive supply contracts.   
 
IV. Price Response from Customers Facing Hourly Prices 
 
Of the utilities currently offering default RTP, only Niagara Mohawk has conducted a 
formal evaluation of customers’ price response.  The most recent analysis found that, in 
aggregate, Niagara Mohawk customers exposed to day-ahead hourly prices, through either the 
default RTP tariff or a similar pricing arrangement with a competitive retailer, reduced their load 
by an amount equal to approximately 10% of their combined demand, when day-ahead peak 
period prices exceeded $500/MWh.9  Based on the total load currently facing hourly prices, a 
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load reduction of this magnitude corresponds to about 0.6% of Niagara Mohawk’s total system 
peak.   
The default RTP tariffs currently offered in Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania are 
indexed to the real time market.  The utility and regulatory staff interviewed from these 
jurisdictions offered their view that customers currently on default RTP service are probably not 
actively monitoring or responding to hourly prices, but they also noted that no formal study of 
customers’ price responsiveness has yet been performed.  Thus, no firm conclusions can be 
drawn at this time about whether, or to what extent, customers remaining on the default RTP 
service in these states respond to hourly prices.  
Data on the price responsiveness of customers that face hourly prices in their competitive 
supply contracts is similarly sparse.  Suppliers indicated that they have not formally analyzed the 
load response of customers on hourly pricing and do not account for their price response in 
scheduling or procurement activities.  Most shared the view that the majority of customers do not 
modify their usage in response to changes in hourly prices, with the exception of a small number 
of customers with onsite generation or discrete production processes that can be shifted or 
curtailed.  As noted previously, all suppliers suggested that the vast majority of customers 
electing to pay hourly prices have done so for reasons unrelated to price response.  Perhaps, as a 
consequence of such views, retail suppliers reportedly do not highlight potential cost savings 
from load response in their marketing activities, nor do they offer many services that would 
enhance customer’s capability to respond to hourly prices.10
 
V. A Comparison to Utility and ISO/RTO Demand Response Programs 
 
Hourly electricity pricing is one mechanism for stimulating price responsive demand.  
Demand response (DR) programs, which offer explicit payments to customers for load 
reductions, represent a different, and potentially complementary, type of approach.  DR 
programs can be classified according to whether they are used to elicit load reductions in 
response to reliability conditions (“emergency programs”) or to economic conditions such as 
high spot market prices (“economic programs”), and also according to the type of commitment 
required of the customer and the form of payment offered.  Using the latter approach, most DR 
programs fall into one of three general types: 
 
(1) Call Option Load Reduction Programs provide customers with an up-front payment in 
exchange for making a standing commitment over a designated time frame (e.g., the 
summer season) to reduce their load if requested.  Customers that do not curtail when 
requested are assessed non-compliance penalties.  
(2) Scheduled Load Reduction Programs provide customers with payments based on their 
actual load reductions.  To receive such payments, customers must commit to reducing 
their load by a specific amount during a designated time period (e.g., the following day 
from 2:00 - 6:00 PM).   
(3) Voluntary Load Reduction Programs require no prior customer commitment and provide 
payments based on customers’ actual load reductions.   
 
In each region with default RTP, large C&I customers have the opportunity to participate 
in a variety of DR programs offered by either the regional transmission organization or 
independent system operator (RTO/ISO) or by their local utility.  When customers enroll in DR 
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programs, they nominate a load reduction quantity or firm load level, which represents either 
their firm commitment (in the case of call option programs) or a rough indication of their likely 
load reduction (for most other programs).  In regions with default RTP, the combined load 
reduction nominated by large C&I customers participating in DR programs ranged from 1-5% of 
the corresponding utility’s or state’s system peak load in 2004 (see Figure 4).11
 But how have these DR programs actually performed?  Emergency DR programs in these 
regions, which includes call option and voluntary programs, have demonstrated load reductions 
in the range of 1-3% of the system peak demand for the respective utility or state.12  In general, 
call option programs have elicited load reductions at or near participants’ contracted level, 
because of customers’ incentive to avoid non-compliance penalties.  Voluntary load reduction 
programs have also successfully elicited sizable reductions when sufficiently high incentive 
payments are offered (e.g., the $500/MWh floor price in NYISO’s EDRP and PJM’s Emergency 
LRP).13
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Figure 4.  2004 DR Program Enrollment (Participants’ Nominated or Contracted Load Reduction) 
 
VI. Policy Implications and Recommendations Related to Developing Price Responsive 
Demand in Competitive Retail Markets 
 
A. The indirect effects of default RTP on the development of price responsive 
demand may be just as important as the direct effects. 
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The direct impact of default RTP on the development of price responsive demand is a 
function of the amount of load remaining on the rate and the price responsiveness of those 
customers.  Experience to date suggests that, over the long run, most customers will leave default 
RTP when implemented in states with retail choice – an outcome consistent with its intended 
purpose.  As a result, the price responsive demand directly associated with default RTP may 
ultimately be rather limited.  
However, our research highlights a number of potentially significant indirect impacts.  
Because some customers evidently use the default rate as a benchmark and seek out competitive 
contracts with a comparable pricing structure, designating RTP instead of a fixed price rate as the 
default service may create additional demand for hourly pricing options in the competitive 
market.  Education and training conducted as part of default RTP implementation, as well as 
direct experience on the rate (even if unintended), may help to raise customers’ awareness and 
comfort level with hourly pricing, further bolstering customer demand for hourly pricing 
products.  Finally, the deployment of additional interval metering may stimulate greater interest 
in hourly pricing arrangements with competitive suppliers and DR programs.   
 
B. Default RTP indexed to day-ahead market prices can be an effective strategy 
for simultaneously supporting retail market development and demand 
response. 
 
Default RTP rates that are indexed to the day-ahead energy market provide customers 
with a more compelling incentive for price response than those that are indexed to the real time 
market, while retaining the essential features that make hourly pricing an attractive default 
service.14  Although the price response of customers exposed to real-time hourly pricing has yet 
to be formally documented, the response is likely to be greater if customers are provided firm 
hourly prices a day in advance, as customers then have more certainty about the financial 
consequences of load response.  Furthermore, this effect not applies only to customers remaining 
on the default rate, but it also spills over into the competitive market, given that competitive 
retail contracts often mirror the pricing structure of the default service.   
 
C. The desired level of price response may not spring forth naturally. 
 
Our research reveals several encouraging signs regarding the development of price 
responsive demand in competitive retail markets, but also important barriers.  Between default 
RTP service and hourly pricing arrangements offered by competitive suppliers, large C&I 
customers in many regions now have ample opportunity to purchase their electricity at hourly 
prices.  Competitive suppliers further offer a variety of products that allow customers to 
customize their exposure to hourly price volatility, including block-and-index type arrangements.  
The limited evidence available to date suggests that, at least in several markets, a fairly sizable 
fraction (perhaps 20-60%) of the large C&I load is currently facing hourly prices through either 
the default RTP service or a competitive supply contract.   
However, it is unclear whether an appreciable level of price response has, or is likely to, 
accompany this growth in the availability and adoption of hourly pricing.  In most states with 
default RTP, few activities have been conducted to help customers identify, analyze, or 
implement load response strategies.  Nor do retail suppliers generally offer such services to their 
customers on hourly pricing.  Given consumers’ entrenched habits and expectations, developed 
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over decades of paying for electricity at fixed prices, load response to hourly pricing will likely 
be quite limited in the near to mid-term in the absence of concerted efforts to nurture customers’ 
price response capabilities.   
In many customer choice states, the regulatory commission and utilities have conducted 
general customer education activities to provide basic information about restructuring and/or 
default service.  Policymakers should consider using these forums as an opportunity to help 
customers better understand the potential cost savings and risk management benefits associated 
with load response to hourly spot market prices.  Additional programmatic efforts, such as 
facility DR audits, customer training, and financial assistance with DR enabling technologies 
should also be considered, perhaps in conjunction with energy efficiency and load management 
initiatives. 
 
D. Policymakers lack critical information about the price responsiveness of  
customers in retail choice states.  
 
Several major policy and wholesale market design issues may hinge on the price 
responsiveness of retail electricity consumers, including continuation of wholesale market price 
caps, the need for an ICAP requirement, and whether ISOs should offer economic DR programs 
that provide additional financial inducements for customers to curtail.  Yet, little information is 
currently being collected in competitive retail markets regarding either the amount of load facing 
hourly prices or the actual price responsiveness of those customers.  To address this critical 
information void, federal and state regulators and ISO/RTOs should consider undertaking efforts 
to periodically collect and analyze data on retail customers’ supply arrangements and quantify 
the extent of response to hourly pricing and other dynamic pricing options.   
 
E. Emergency DR programs complement dynamic retail pricing.     
 
Emergency DR programs, including both voluntary and call option type programs, have a 
demonstrated track record of obtaining load reductions of 1-3% of the system peak, when events 
are called.  These DR programs provide explicit payments to customers for load reductions and 
can serve as a backstop to mitigate various contingencies that threaten the reliability of the power 
system.  Such DR programs can serve as an effective complement to dynamic pricing initiatives 
at the retail level by providing a training ground for customers to assess their load curtailment 
potential and obtain actual operational experience implementing load reduction strategies on 
short notice and by providing additional business opportunities for various types of DR service 
providers.  They can also provide a revenue stream to customers on hourly pricing, to help justify 
the cost of enabling technologies for demand response that also bolster customers’ 
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structure of their supply contract.
 
9  See Goldman et al., 2005, supra note 6. 
 
10 Several retail suppliers reported that they do offer internet-based access to hourly load data or 
“price alert” services.  However, none integrate technical assistance (e.g., facility audits or 
analyses of load response technologies/strategies) into their commodity service. 
 
11 Depending on program rules, the nominated load reduction across multiple programs offered 
by the same ISO or utility may be additive, as is the case for NYISO’s ICAP/SCR and EDRP 
programs. 
 
12 See Barbose et al., 2005, supra note 1. 
 
13 See B. Neenan, D. Pratt, P. Cappers, J. Doane, J. Anderson, R. Boisvert, C. Goldman, O. 
Sezgen, G. Barbose, R. Bharvirkar, M. Kintner-Meyer, S. Shankle, and D. Bates, How and Why 
Customers Respond to Electricity Price Variability: A Study of NYISO and NYSERDA 2002 PRL 
Program Performance, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory: LBNL-52209, January 2003. 
 
14 If day-ahead default RTP service is adopted, regulators should fully account for the associated 
load forecasting risks and balancing costs born by the default supplier, to ensure that the default 
service does not interfere with competitive suppliers’ ability to offer day-ahead hourly pricing. 
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